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Abstract. Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) have conjectured that ex-
clusive use of negligence liability leads to suboptimal choice of precaution in
the presence of uncertainty and that ex ante regulation can correct these inef-
ficiencies. We complete their argument by making a mild additional premise.
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Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation:
Substitutes or Complements? Comment
In a past article for this Review, Charles Kolstad, Thomas Ulen, and Gary
Johnson (1990) argue that the exclusive use of negligence liability leads to sub-
optimal choice of precaution in the presence of uncertainty and that ex ante
regulation can correct these ineﬃciencies. The authors state five propositions
that illustrate the distortionary eﬀect of an ex-post liability rule and show how
ex-ante regulation can promote a more eﬃcient level of precaution. Kolstad,
Ulen, and Johnson (1990) base the proofs of these propositions on their equa-
tion (8), which gives a derived expression for the expected total cost of the
injurer. However, under the general assumptions made by the authors, this
equation must read
TC(x) = C(x) + A˜(x)R(x),
where A˜(x) is expected damage payment conditional on the event that the
injurer is found liable by the court, i.e.
A˜(x) = E[p(x, ε)D(x, ε) | x¯(ε) > x].
There is no obvious reason why, in the absense of further assumptions, the
conditional expectation A˜(x) should be equal to the unconditional
A(x) = E[p(x, ε)D(x, ε)],
as suggested in the article.
The analysis of Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990) is complete under mild
additional premises. Assume first that — as suggested by Shavell (1987 p.152) —
the magnitude of liability equals ex-ante expected damages E[D(x, ε)] instead
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of actual damages D(x, ε). Assume in addition that the probability of an
accident is independent of the random variable ε representing the “view-of-
the-court”, i.e. that p(x, ε) = p(x). Then the injurer’s total cost given by
equation (5) in Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson (1990) amounts to
TC(x) = E[C(x) + L(x, ε)p(x)E[D(x, ε)]].
Since A(x) = p(x)E[D(x, ε)] is now independent of ε, their equation (8) in fact
holds true.
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